Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2006

Raymond L. Balentine v. Corina L. Gehring : Brief
of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brett D. Cragun; Law Office of Ray G. Martineau; Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner.
Kellie F. Williams; Corporon, Williams & Bradford; Attorney for Appellee/Respondent and
Appellee/Intervenor.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Balentine v. Gehring, No. 20060714 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6735

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAYMOND L. BALENTINE,
Appellant/Petitioner,
-vsCORINA L. GEHRING,

Appellate Court Case No. 20060714 CA

Appellee/Respondent,
Lower Court Case No. 054902276
GREGG GEHRING,
Appellee/Intervenor.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent and
Appel 1 ee/Intervenor
CORPORON, WILLIAMS & BRADFORD, P.C.

405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-328-1162
Facsimile: 801-363-8243

BRETT D. CRAGUN, #8683
Attorney for Appellant/ Petitioner
LAW OFFICE OF RAY G. MARTINEAU

3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 801-486-0200
Facsimile: 801-486-0383

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

DEC 18 2006

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAYMOND L. BALENTINE,
Appellant/Petitioner,
-vsCORINA L. GEHRING,

Appellate Court Case No. 20060714 CA

Appellee/Respondent,
Lower Court Case No. 054902276
GREGG GEHRING,
Appellee/Intervenor.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent and
Appellee/Intervenor
CORPORON, WILLIAMS & BRADFORD, P.C.
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-328-1162
Facsimile: 801-363-8243

BRETT D. CRAGUN, #8683
Attorney for Appellant/ Petitioner
LAW OFFICE OF RAY G. MARTINEAU
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: 801 -486-0200
Facsimile: 801-486-0383

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE LAW

3

STATEMENT OF CASE - NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

10

ARGUMENT

14

I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL DID NOT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

14

II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH LAW IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING BALENTINE STANDING TO
ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS BRIANNA'S FATHER
19

III.

THE UNIFORM UTAH PARENTAGE ACT CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
TRIAL COURTS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT

25

IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AS THERE WAS NO
GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
27

V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT BALENTINE HAD NO
STANDING TO ASSERT HIS PATERNITY AND THUS PROPERLY
DISMISSED HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY

29

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE

31

VI.

CONCLUSION

33

ii

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

35

ADDENDA

36

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
State ex rel. M.S. v. Salata. 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah Ct App. 1991)

31

Beeslev v. Harris (In re Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994)

32

Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah Ct App. 1989)

31

Gribble v. Gribble. 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978)

29

Holder v. Holder. 940 P.2d 761 (Utah 1959)

19

In re: J.W.F.. 799 P.2d, 710 (Utah 1990). . . . 3, 5, 8, 10-13, 16, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 29-31,
33,34
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks. 2000 UT 30 % 12 (Utah 2000)

33
2, 14

Michael H. et al v. Gerald Dee. 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
20-22
Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128 (Utah Ct App. 2006) cert, granted 2006 Utah
Lexis 185 (Utah 2006)(No. 20060563)
3, 11, 14, 16-18, 23, 24, 27
Provo City v. Cannon. 1999 UT App 344, U 5 (Utah Ct App. 1999)

2

Salt Lake City v. Ohms. 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)

30

State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah Ct App. 1990)

32

Swan Creek Vill. Homeowner's Ass'n v. Warne. 2006 UT 22, f 16 (Utah 2006)

28

Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)

31

Wilson v. Family Servs. Div.. Region Two. 554 P.2d 227,231 (Utah 1976)

29

Wilson v. Valley Mental Health. 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998)

iv

2

RULES
Rule 24 (a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended in 1994
Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

31, 32
5
28

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 (2005)

9, 28

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 (2005)

3, 22

Utah Code Ann. § 30-l-17.2(2)(a)

25

Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989)

30

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-101 et. seq

22, 33

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (2005)

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204 (2005)

3, 10, 22, 25

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l) (2005)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(a) (2005)

12-14, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(b) (2005)

12, 15, 22, 26, 33

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(c)

14, 22, 25, 26

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204 (2)

13, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-301(3)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-504

29

v

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-601 etseq (2005)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602 (2005)

3
3, 10, 14, 22, 25

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602(3) (2005)

14, 25

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2005)

3, 5, 10, 12-15, 22, 25, 26, 33

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-608(l)

15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-609

14, 25

Utah Uniform Parentage Act

14, 15, 22, 27, 30, 33

OTHER
Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a)

21

VI

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Appellee/Respondent and
Appellee/Intervenor
CORPORON, WILLIAMS & BRADFORD, P.C.
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-328-1162
Facsimile: 801-363-8243

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
RAYMOND L. BALENTINE,

: BRIEF OF APPELLEES

Appellant/Petitioner,
-vsCORINA L. GEHRING,
Appellate Court Case No. 20060714 CA
Lower Court Case No. 054902276

Appellee/Respondent,

GREGG GEHRING,

:

Appellee/Intervenor.

:

COMES NOW, Appellees, Gregg Gehring and Corina Gehring, by and through
counsel, and hereby submits the following as their response to Appellant's Brief.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to find that equitable estoppel barred the granting
1

of Appellee's motion for summary judgment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW - A trial court's denial or granting of a motion for
summary judgment is viewed for correctness. No deference is accorded to the trial
court's conclusions of law. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30 f 12 (Utah 2000).

2.

Did the trial court err in granting Appellee/Intervenor's summary judgment to bar

Appellant/Respondent from challenging the minor child's paternity under relevant Utah
case law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW - A trial court's denial or granting of a motion for
summary judgment is viewed for correctness. No deference is accorded to the trial
court's conclusions of law. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30 f 12 (Utah 2000).

3.

Did the trial court err in granting Appellee/Intervenor's summary judgment to bar

Appellant/Respondent's challenge to the minor child's paternity under the Utah Uniform
Parentage Act?
STANDARD OF REVIEW - A trial court's denial or granting of a Motion for
Summary Judgment is viewed for correctness. No deference is accorded to the trial
court's conclusions of law. Malibu Inv. Co. v. Sparks, 2000 UT 30 If 12 (Utah 2000).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.
Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App 344, f 5 (Utah Ct App. 1999). See also, Wilson v.
Vallev Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416 (Utah 1998) (holding that when construing a statute
2

the courts' primary purpose is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the
purpose the statute was meant to achieve. If the language is ambiguous, the court must
look first to the statutes plain language and then to the legislative history and relevant
policy considerations).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CASE LAW
Statutes and case law which are determinative or of essential importance to this
appeal are as follows:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2 (2005);

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-201 (2005);

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204 (2005), attached as Addendum 1;

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-601 et seq (2005), attached as Addendum 2;

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602 (2005);

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2005);

7.

In re: J.W.F.. 799 P.2d, 710 (Utah 1990), attached as Addendum 3.

8.

Pearson v. Pearson. 2006 UT App 128 (Utah Ct App. 2006) cert, granted 2006
Utah Lexis 185 (Utah 2006)(No. 20060563).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND
DISPOSITION BELOW
This case concerns whether Appellant/Petitioner, Raymond Balentine, (hereinafter,

"Balentine") has a right to assert paternity of the minor child, Brianna, when she has a
3

presumed father in Appellee/Intervenor, Gregg Gehring (hereinafter, "Father"). Brianna
was born during Father's marriage to Appellee/Respondent, Corina Gehring (hereinafter,
"Mother"). (R. 102, 164, 188) Balentine filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity
and Child Custody on April 25, 2005. (R. 1-15.) Mother filed a Verified Petition for
Declaration of Paternity, Child Custody, Child Support and Visitation on April 27, 2005.
(R. 20, 163)1, unaware that Balentine had previously filed a Petition. Mother used that
petition as a vehicle for filing a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, which
restraining order was signed by the Honorable Judge Sandra Peuler on May 9, 2005. (R.
26-28.) Pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order, Balentine was ordered to return
Brianna to Mother. (R. 27-28.) In her minute entry, Judge Peuler indicated that Balentine
had no "legal rights to custody or visitation as paternity had not been established and,
further, that Brianna was legally the child of Mother and her husband", Father. (R. 29.)
Copies of the Temporary Restraining Order and the Minute Entry are attached as
Addendum 4 and Addendum 5, respectfully.
On January 17, 2006, Father filed a Verified Motion to Intervene and a Motion for
Summary Judgment asking the court to dismiss Balentine's paternity petition and deny
Balentine standing to pursue his paternity claim. (R. 96-119.) Balentine opposed Father's
Motion for Summary Judgment and the matter proceeded to hearing on March 27, 2006
before Commissioner Michelle R. Blomquist. (R. 129-149, R. 312.)

1

An Order was granted by the trial court consolidating the two petitions on June
6,2005. (R. 43-44.)
4

At the hearing, Balentine stipulated to Father's intervention. (R. 287-289, R. 312 at
p. 3: lines 5-6.) After argument on Father's motion for summary judgment,
Commissioner Blomquist recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment be
denied. (R. 161, R. 312 at p. 18: lines 11-14). Commissioner Blomquist made a
recommendation that the policy considerations outlined in In re J.W.F. 799 P.2d 710
(Utah 1990) (hereinafter "Schoolcraft") specific to preserving an intact marriage and
protecting children from unnecessary attacks on paternity could potentially apply in this
case. Id at 712. (R. 312 at p. 16: line 25, p. 17: lines 1-7.) However, the Commissioner
found that Mother's filing of a paternity and child custody petition overcame the
limitation set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2005) on challenges to the
presumption of paternity. (R. 312 at p. 17: lines 15-22.) The Commissioner further
indicated that her decision stemmed from the fact that Mother's petition had not yet been
dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 312 at p.
17: line 23-25, p. 18: line 1-10.)
Father and Mother filed an objection to the recommendation of the Commissioner
on April 6, 2006. (R. 182-268.) The trial court heard arguments on the objection to
recommendation on May 30, 2006. (R. 313.) The Honorable Judge Anthony Quinn found
that summary judgment should have been granted and granted Father and Mother's
motion and dismissed Balentine's petition to declare paternity of Brianna. (R. 313, 292302.) Copies of the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached as
Addendum 6. Copies of the trial court's Summary Judgment and Order on Objection to
5

Recommendation is attached as Addendum 7.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Father and Mother were married on April 30, 1999, in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah. (R. 102.) Father and Mother were still married, and resided together in Salt Lake
County at the time this matter proceeded to hearing. (R. 293.)
For a time in 2002 Father and Mother were separated, while Mother participating
in a drug rehabilitation program. Mother met Balentine, who was also participating in the
program. (R. 102.) During the time that Mother and Father were separated Mother
became pregnant. (R. 102.) Mother left the drug rehabilitation center and moved back in
with Father and reconciled their marriage. (R. 102.)
On December 13, 2002, Brianna Renee Gehring was born. (R. 1, 36, 97, 102, 164,
188.) Thereafter, the child resided with Mother and Father. (R. 102, 164, 188.) Father's
name is on the birth certificate as the Father of the child. (R. 36, 102, 164, 188.)
Balentine attempted to contact Mother and Brianna for the first time in December,
2003 when Brianna was approximately one (1) year old. (R. 102.) In February, 2004,
Balentine submitted himself for genetic testing, (R. 13) and after discussions in May,
2004, Mother and Father permitted Balentine to spend some limited time with Brianna.
(R. 103, 293 t 4.)
For a period of time after January, 2005, Mother allowed Balentine to have greater
contact with Brianna. (R. 102, 188.) In fact, Mother signed a notarized statement, dated
January 13, 2005, granting temporary custody of Brianna to Balentine. (R. 148.) This
6

occurred during a period of difficulty in Mother and Father's marriage, which Mother and
Father attribute to the influence of Balentine. (R. 103, 189.) From the time of
Balentine's renewed contact with Mother in December, 2003 until April, 2005, by his
words and actions, Balentine attempted to influence Mother's relationship with Father.
(R. 107.)
In April, 2005, Mother and Father again reconciled. (R. 103, 189.) Numerous
demands were made to Balentine to return Brianna to the care of Mother and Father. (R.
26, 103.) Balentine refused to return Brianna to Mother and filed an action for paternity
and child custody on April 25, 2005. (R. 3; R. 23-25.) Before Mother was served with
Balentine's petition, and due to the fact that Balentine refused to return Brianna to her,
Mother filed her own action for paternity and child custody on April 27, 2005, as a
vehicle to obtain emergency relief and to assert her custodial rights to Brianna. (R. 20,
163.)
Mother filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (R. 23-25) and on May
9, 2005, the Honorable Judge Sandra N. Peuler granted Mother's motion and ordered
Balentine to immediately return the child to Mother. (R. 26-28.) At this hearing,
Balentine was informed by Judge Peuler, that he had "no legal rights" to Brianna because
the child was legally the child of Mother and Father. (R. 29.)
On May 23, 2005, Judge Peuler extended the Temporary Restraining Order and
denied Balentine's requested motion for visitation. (R. 30.) Subsequent to May 9, 2005
Balentine has had no further contact with Brianna.
7

On or about June 2, 2005, Mother filed an answer to Balentine's petition and
requested that Balentine's petition be dismissed with prejudice. (R. 49-52.) Within
Mother's answer, Mother denied Balentine was the father and denied that parent time
should be established for Brianna. (R. 34.)
On January 17, 2006, Father filed a Motion to Intervene, Motion for Summary
Judgment, and Verified Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.
(R. 96-100; R. 93-95; R. 101-119.)
On March 27, 2006 a hearing was held before Commissioner Michelle R.
Blomquist on Father's Motion to Intervene and Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 312.)
At hearing, the parties stipulated to Father's intervention and an Order granting Father's
intervention was signed by the court May 15, 2006. (R. 290.)
At the time of hearing on March 27, 2006, though she acknowledged that the
Schoolcraft policy considerations could potentially apply, Commissioner Blomquist
denied Father's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 284-286.) The primary basis for
denying Father's Motion was the fact that Mother had previously filed a petition for
paternity which had not been dismissed. (R. 312 at p. 17: lines 23-25, p. 18: lines 1-3.)
Father and Mother filed an Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation on
April 6, 2006, which motion proceeded to hearing before Judge Anthony Quinn on May
30, 2006. (R. 182;R.313.)
Again, during this entire period and through the time of Judge Quinn's hearing on
Father's summary judgment motion, Balentine had no contact with Brianna nor supported
8

her in any way. (R. 164, 189, 293, f 5.) From May 9, 2005 until Father filed his Motion
to Intervene and Motion for Summary Judgment, Balentine did very little to prosecute his
paternity action. (R. 164.) Only a minimal amount of discovery was completed.
Morevoer, Balentine never formally filed any paternity test results indicating the paternity
of Brianna at any time during this action. In fact, the letter from Affiliated Genetics
indicating the DNA test results attached to Balentine's paternity petition specifically
states that "[t]he samples used in this test were not collected under recommended
parentage chain of custody guidelines. This report should be used for personal
information." (R. 13.)
The record is devoid of any effort on the part of Balentine to ask the trial court for
summary judgment or other affirmative relief in regard to his alleged paternity of
Brianna. It was only when Father filed his Motion to Intervene and Motion for Summary
Judgment to Dismiss Balentine's paternity action that Balentine recommenced
prosecuting his action.
At the hearing on May 30, 2006 on Mother and Father's Objection to
Recommendation, Judge Quinn sustained the Objection to Recommendation, determining
that the Commissioner was incorrect in her recommendation, and granted Father's Motion
for Summary Judgment. (R. 295, 297-298.) In granting Father's Motion for Summary
Judgment, the court dismissed Balentine's petition to establish paternity of Brianna. (R.
297-298.) The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment and
Order on Objection to Recommendation were signed on July 3, 2006. (R. 292-298.)
9

Judge Quinn found that Mother and Father were married in 1999 and were still
married at the time summary judgment was granted. (R. 293, ^ 1.) Judge Quinn further
found that Father was the legal father of Brianna and that no legal declaration had been
made that Balentine was the biological father of Brianna. (R. 293, f 3.) Judge Quinn also
found that since May, 2005, Balentine had not had any contact with Brianna, nor
supported her. (R. 293, | 5.) Furthermore, Judge Quinn found that the policy
considerations set forth in Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah, 1990) to determine a person's
standing to challenge paternity were applicable in the instant case, (R. 293-94, f 5) and
that when these policy considerations were applied to Balentine's position, Balentine
must be denied standing to assert paternity. (R. 293-94, | 5.)
The trial court found that the undisputed facts were that Mother and Father had an
intact marriage and family, and, therefore, Balentine could not satisfy the first prong of
the Schoolcraft test. (R. 294, ^f 5.) Moreover, Judge Quinn found that to permit Balentine
standing would result in an unnecessary attack on Brianna's paternity, and, therefore,
Balentine could not satisfy the second prong of the Schoolcraft test. (R. 293, f 5.)
The trial court further found that pursuant to the Utah Uniform Parentage Act and,
more specifically, Utah Annotated Code § 78-45g-204, 602 and 607, Mother and Father
were the only individuals who could attack the paternity of Brianna. (R. 294, f 5)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The fundamental issue in this case is whether the trial court was correct in granting
summary judgment which dismissed Balentine's paternity action for lack of standing to
10

assert paternity of a minor child born within the intact marriage of Mother and Father.
The trial court correctly applied Utah case law and statutory law and did not err in
granting summary judgment to dismiss Balentine's paternity action. The trial court fully
considered the public policies surrounding the presumption of legitimacy. Utah case law
is clear that when a child is born into an intact marriage, there is a presumption of
legitimacy that the husband is the child of the father. Schoolcraft, 799 P.2d 710 (Utah
1990); Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 UT App 128 (Utah Ct App. 2006) cert, granted 2006
Utah Lexis 185 (Utah 2006)(No. 20060563). In order to rebut the presumption in favor
of Father and in order to be granted standing, Balentine was required to overcome, or
meet, two very specific tests first articulated in Schoolcraft. In Schoolcraft, the Utah
Supreme Court set forth the policies to be given "paramount consideration" in
determining standing to assert paternity; to wit: (1) "preserving the stability of the
marriage," and (2)" protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon
their paternity." Schoolcraft. 799 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1990).
In applying Schoolcraft to the facts of this case, Judge Quinn found that Mother
and Father were married in 1999, were married at the time Brianna's birth in 2002, and
were still married and in an intact marriage at the date of the hearing on Father's
Objection to the Commissioner's Recommendation on May 30, 2006. (R. 294, \ 5.)
Therefore, it is an undisputed fact that Mother and Father had an intact marriage and
family and Balentine did not meet the first prong of the Schoolcraft test. (R. 294, f 5.)
Balentine has argued that the definition of what an intact marriage is constitutes a
11

disputed fact. Mother and Father disagree and believe that it is an issue of law once it
clear that there is a marital unit, not disrupted by divorce or separation, at the time that an
attack is made on the paternity of the child born within the union.
The trial court also found that at no time had there been a legal determination that
Balentine was Brianna's biological father. (R. 293, f 3.) Further, the trial court found that
because Brianna was born into and being raised within an intact family unit, that to permit
Balentine standing to assert paternity would be an unnecessary and disruptive attack on
Brianna's paternity. (R. 294, ^f 5) Therefore, Balentine did not meet the second prong of
the Schoolcraft test.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court correctly found that Balentine had no
standing to attack Brianna's paternity.
In addition to Utah case law, Utah statutory law is clear as to who may rebut the
presumption of paternity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(a) (2005) states that a "man
is presumed to be the father of a child if he and the mother of the child are married to
each other and the child is born during the marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(b)
(2005) states that the "presumption of paternity may only be rebutted in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2005) states that
"paternity of a child conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father as
described in § 78-45g-204 (l)(a)... may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at
any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce
of the parent."
12

In this case, Judge Quinn found that mother and father were married at the time
Brianna was born and, therefore, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204 (l)(a)
Father was the presumed father. The trial court also found, in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45g-204 (2), read in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607, that
because Father was the presumed father, only Father and Mother could attack the
presumption of paternity. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted Father's motion for
summary judgment, denying Balentine standing to assert paternity and dismissing
Balentine's paternity action.
The trial court also correctly found that equitable estoppel was not applicable in
this case, based upon the fact that Balentine did not have standing to challenge paternity,
and that, again, summary judgment was appropriate.
Finally, the trial court properly denied Balentine standing to request custody or
visitation of Brianna based on the "best interests of the child" as articulated in
Schoolcraft 799 P.2d at 715. The trial court found that Balentine waited one year after
Brianna's birth before attempting to initiate any contact or support. (R. 293.) The court
further found that since May 9, 2005, Balentine had not had any contact with nor had he
supported Brianna in any way. (R. 289.) Therefore, the trial court correctly found that no
legal declaration had been made declaring Balentine as Brianna's father. (R. 293.) The
trial court was correct in its granting of summary judgment and dismissed Balentine's
paternity actions.

13

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT EQUITABLE
ESTOPPEL DID NOT PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Courts have recently recognized the availability of equitable estoppel principles to

bar paternity challenges. Pearson. 2006 Ut App 128, AT f 38, n. 11. However, before
such arguments can be made, the court must first determine whether Balentine had
standing to do so. In Malibu Inv.. 2000 UT at If 23, the court stated, "[t]o determine
standing, we look to those provisions in the acts describing those who may bring suit."
Pursuant to Malibu, the court must first look to the legislative acts or codes describing
those who may bring suit. Id.
Balentine argues that the Utah Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter "UUPA") § 7845g-602 (2005) grants him standing to maintain a paternity action, because it specifies
the individuals who have standing to maintain a proceeding for the adjudication of
parentage. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602(3) (2005) states, in relevant part, "[a] man
whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated" has standing to maintain a paternity
proceeding. However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-602 (2005) also limits this and makes
standing subject to Part 3 of the UUPA which sets forth the process of voluntary a
declaration of parentage, in concert with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-609 and § 78-45g607.
Utah Ann. Code § 78-45g-607 (2005) (1) states that, "[p]aternity of a child
conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father as described in § 78-45g-

14

204(1 )(a), (b), or (c) may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any time
prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of divorce of the
parents."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(2005) which states that "[a] man is presumed to
be the father of a child if: (a) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and
the child is born during the marriage." Moreover, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45g-204(2) limits
the rebuttal of a this presumption of paternity and specifically states that the presumption
may only be rebutted in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607. (Emphasis
added). Further, and importantly, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-301(3) states: "[i]f a child
has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are inadmissable to challenge
paternity except as set forth in § 78-45g-607."
When each of the relevant provisions of UUP A are read together, the statute
plainly states that, beyond doubt, Father is the presumed father of Brianna and Balentine
is not. Further, given the marriage of Mother and Father, Balentine may not attempt to
rebut Father's presumption of paternity, as he does not have standing to do so.
Moreover, equitable estoppel is addressed under the UUPA only in regard to the
court's ability to deny motions for genetic testing or disregard test results under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45g-608(l). That code provisions states as follows:
(1) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a
presumed father or to challenge the paternity of a child having a declarant
father, the tribunal may deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing
of the mother, the child, and the presumed or declarant father, or if testing
has been completed, the tribunal may disregard genetic test results that
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exclude the presumed or declarant father if the tribunal determines that:
(a) the conduct of the mother or the presumed or declarant father estops
that party from denying parentage; and
(b) it would be inequitable to disrupt the father-child relationship
between the child and the presumed or declarant father.
Therefore, equitable estoppel may prevent Mother and Father from denying
paternity, but is not available to Balentine.
Furthermore, Utah case law provides a clear two prong test for trial courts to
consider when determining standing of an individual asserting paternity. In Schoolcraft
the Utah Supreme Court states that the paramount considerations, when determining who
can challenge the presumption of legitimacy, should be given to: (1) "preserving the
stability of the marriage;" and (2) "protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary
attacks upon their paternity." 799 P.2d at 713. Equitable estoppel is not a part of that two
prong test.
Finally, this Court further defined how and when an individual can establish
standing to challenge paternity of a child born into a marriage. See, Pearson, 2006 UT
App 128. (hereinafter "Pearson"). Within Pearson, this court found that a child born into a
marriage "is immediately subject to a defacto adoption by the mother's husband" thereby
limiting the time in which a challenge to paternity could occur. Id at U 35. The court in
Pearson went on to state that: "we see no reason why a man who chooses to procreate
with a wife of another should be granted significant latitude to challenge the husband's
defacto adoption, while one who fails to timely establish his paternity of child born to an
unmarried women is permanently barred from doing do so upon the mother's mere
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consent to the child's adoption." Id. Once again, equitable estoppel is not a part of the
analysis in Pearson, as being available to a person in the position of Balentine.
Balentine argues that because Mother tacitly or implicitly acknowledged at one
point that Balentine was the biological father and allowed him some time to spend with
Brianna, that she is estopped from denying his paternity action. However, Appellant is
misguided in his argument, and his argument must fail for a variety of reasons.
First, Appellant raises allegedly contested facts in his brief without citing to the
record. There has been no court order establishing Balentine as the biological father. (R.
29, 293, If 3) Though facts presented in this case may allege or assert Balentine is the
father, it has never been legally established. (R. 29, 293 f 3.) Moreover, the facts are
clear that Brianna was born into the intact marriage of Mother and Father who provided
for her emotional, physical and financial support. (R. 102, 164, 188.) Based upon
Appellants failure to marshal the evidence, as argued below in section VI, and based upon
the established and uncontroverted facts, equitable estoppel is not available as an
affirmative defense to the presumption of paternity.
Second, even if equitable estoppel did apply to the alleged facts improperly
referred to by Balentine, the fact that Mother reconciled with Father during gestation,
gave birth to Brianna while married and living with Father, and continued to stay married
and live with father at the time of the hearing on the Objection to Recommendation would
negate any alleged facts. This court, in Pearson, alluded, in footnote 11, that the mother
in that case would be barred from challenging the minor child's paternity based on the
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fact that she reconciled with her husband and stayed married to him for almost a year
before entering divorce proceedings. Id. at f 38. The facts in the instant case are much
clearer, and, if using this Pearson analysis were employed hereMother and Father would
be barred from challenging Brianna's paternity.
Lastly, even if the facts, as improperly alleged and referred to in Balentine's brief
existed, Appellant can point to no actions or omissions on the part of Father that would
permit an equitable estoppel argument as to Father. Again, Father had never filed any
pleading, signed any document or proffered any argument that Balentine was Brianna's
father. Indeed, the undisputed facts show that Brianna was born to Mother and Father
while they were married. (R. 1, 36, 97, 102, 164, 188.) Father's name is on Brianna's
birth certificate and that for the first year of Brianna's life, Balentine did not attempt to
see the child, and did not take actions to assert rights or contact Brianna. (R. 36, 102,
164, 188.) Further, Brianna is four (4) years of age and Mother and Father are married
and continue to provide for Brianna emotionally, physically and financially. More
importantly, from May 9, 2005 through the conclusion of the action in dismissal of
Balentine's paternity petition, Balentine did not have any contact with or support Brianna.
(R. 164, 189, 289, f 5.)
Based on these facts, Balentine has no standing to challenge Brianna's paternity
and the trial court properly determined that equitable estoppel did not apply and properly
granted summary judgment to dismiss Balentine's paternity action.
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II.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED UTAH LAW IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING BALENTINE
STANDING TO ESTABLISH HIMSELF AS BRIANNA'S FATHER,
A husband's rights in children born to his marriage have, from ancient times, been

protected by the presumption of legitimacy. In Holder v. Holder, 940 P.2d 761 (Utah
1959), the Utah Supreme Court noted that the presumption "is rooted in the realization of
the importance of the integrity of the legally recognized family as the basic unit of
society," Id. at 762, and held that: "the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless the
contrary is proved beyond a reasonable doubt...the considerations favoring legitimacy
render it desirable as a matter of policy that the presumption should be accorded the same
weight as the presumption of innocence." Id- at 763.
The Utah Supreme Court in Schoolcraft, stated that when assessing whether an
individual has the ability to intervene to challenge the paternity of a child born into a
marriage, the policies of "paramount consideration" should be: (1) "preserving stability of
the marriage;" and, (2) "protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon
their paternity." Id. at 713. The Court concluded; "whether individuals can challenge the
presumption of legitimacy should depend not on their legal status alone, but on a case by
case determination of whether the above polices would be undermined by permitting the
challenge." Id.
Applying this standard to the facts before it, the Supreme Court found that the
marriage between Schoolcraft and J.W.F.'s mother was "in name only" due to the fact
that Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were separated long before the birth of the minor
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child. Winfield did not even know about the minor child until nine months after the
child's birth. IdL at 712. Therefore, there was no family unit to be interrupted by a
challenge to the child's legitimacy in Schoolcraft.
Conversely, in the instant case, Mother and Father were married, living together,
and committed to the welfare of their daughter. (R. 192; R. 293, ^ 1) Mother and Father's
marriage is not a marriage "in name only" - but a committed familial unit. Balentine
seeks to disrupt this family and "intact marriage" to assert paternity of a child born within
the marriage.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Michael H. et al v. Gerald Dee. 491 U.S. 110 (1989)
supported the mandate of protecting the marital family and children born within it from
disruption and upheld a presumed father's summary judgment motion. The facts in
Michael H. have some similarities to those in the present case, in that the marriage had
suffered some troubled times and periods of separation. Further, the alleged biological
father in that case had substantial contact with the child. In that case, Gerald Dee and
Carol Dee were married when Carol became pregnant by Michael H., and gave birth to a
daughter named Victoria. Over the next few years, Carol and Victoria moved back and
forth between Gerald's home and Michael H's home. Eventually Carol and Gerald
reconciled. Soon after, Michael H. filed an action to establish paternity and visitation.
Gerald, as intervener, moved for summary judgment on the basis that under California
law "there were no triable issues of fact as to Victoria's paternity." The applicable
California statute provides that "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is
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not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Michael
HL, 491 U.S. at 115 (quoting Cal. Evid. Code Ann. § 621(a)). The trial court granted
Intervenor summary judgment and the decision was affirmed by the California Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court.
The United States Supreme Court explained that the rights of the husband must be
accorded greater protection in a case, "where, however, the child is born into an extant
marital family, the natural father's unique opportunity conflicts with a similarly unique
opportunity of the husband of the marriage." Id. at 129. The United States Supreme
Court emphasized that "to provide protection to an adulteress natural father is to deny
protection to a marital father and vice-versa." Id. at 130.
Balentine's actions in this case exemplify the reasons why a court should not allow
a putative father to challenge paternity of a child born into an intact marriage and,
therefore, provide interloper greater rights than a husband and presumed father. Not only
has Balentine attempted to insert himself into an intact family unit, he has also attempted
to assail and weaken the marriage. (R. 103, 107, 189.) Though, Balentine waited until
Brianna was one year old before making any attempts to establish a relationship, upon
that renewed contact with Mother, Balentine attempted to manipulate her and insert
himself into the marriage in such a way that she and Father began to have marital
difficulties. (R. 102; R. 107.) Finally, when Mother and Father reconciled, Balentine
refused to allow Mother and Father to regain custody or to even see Brianna for six weeks
until the trial court entered a temporary restraining order on May 9, 2005. (R. 13-25.)
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Balentine's actions and assertions epitomize what the public policy consideration of
"preserving the stability of marriage" attempts to foreclose.
Further, the statute at issue in the Michael H. case is similar to Utah Code Ann. §
30-1-17.2 and § 78-45g-204(l)(a), both of which state, in relevant part, that "a man is
presumed to be the father of a child if he and the mother of the child are married to each
and the child is born during the marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-17.2; Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45g-204(l)(a) (2005). Moreover, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g204(b) provides that the
presumption can only be rebutted by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607, which allows for the
rebuttal of presumption by the mother and father either before the filing of a divorce
action or within the pleadings of a divorce action.
The court in Michael FL affirmed the California Court of Appeal, finding that a
natural father has a fundamental right to rebut the marital presumption established by
statute, and therefore granted the presumed father's motion for summary judgment and
dismissed the alleged biological father's petition for child custody and visitation. Id at
127. Similarly, in the instant case, the trial court granted Father's summary judgment,
finding that no material issues of fact were in dispute as to Brianna's paternity and, based
on Utah's Uniform Parentage Act, as codified in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-101 et. seq.
The trial court properly found that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204; § 78-45g-602; and, §
78-45g-607, when read together, designate Father as the presumed father of Brianna and
that the presumption can only be rebutted by the mother and the presumed father before a
divorce or within the divorce pleadings. Therefore, the trial court properly found that
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Balentine had no standing to assert his paternity action.
The second policy consideration that the Supreme Court identified in Schoolcraft,
is protecting children from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity. In
Schoolcraft, the child at issue had no relationship with Mr. Schoolcraft. The Supreme
Court found that J.W.F.'s "expectations as to who his Father is cannot be shaken by
permitting a challenge to the presumption of legitimacy. The child has never had a
relationship with Schoolcraft, his biological Father, or even his mother, so he has no
expectations as to who his father is." Id. at 713.
In this case, the child whose paternity is at issue has lived with Mother and Father
for her entire life. (R. 102, 164, 188; R. 293, f 1.) Obviously, Brianna had formed a
strong and secure parent-child bond with Mother and Father when the trial court granted
Father's motion for summary judgment and the child was three (3) years old, she had a
fully developed understanding of who her parents were.
This Court emphasized in Pearson, that a putative father should not be granted
standing within the context of a divorce proceeding even when the putative father had
established a relationship with the minor child, as long as a relationship had previously
been established with the presumed father. Id. at Tf 25. In Pearson, this Court analogized
the status of a putative father in asserting his paternity of a minor child born into a
marriage to that of an unmarried father seeking to establish parental rights to his child in
the face of the mother's intent to have the child adopted. Id at ^f 34. This Court stated
that uan illegitimate child born into marriage is immediately subject to defacto adoption
23

by the mother's husband." Id at f 35. Based on this argument, Balentine, like an
unmarried father who fails to protect his inchoate parental rights, lost his standing to
contest paternity sometime during the early months of the Brianna's life. Not only did
Balentine fail to commence a paternity action or establish a relationship with Brianna
soon after her birth; he failed to attempt to do anything to establish a relationship after
entry of the Temporary Restraining Order on May 9, 2005. (R. 164, 189; R. 293, U 5.)
Appellant argues that due to withdrawals and appointments of new counsel on both
sides, Appellant could not actively proceed. However, the record clearly indicates these
were minor events and that Balentine failed to actively pursue paternity after Judge Peuler
signed the Temporary Restraining Order. Further, Balentine provided the court with no
conclusive paternity test results, nor did he proceed with any motions of any sort to
establish himself as the biological father of the child. It is clear from the record, that it
was not until Father filed his motion to intervene and the motion for summary judgment
that Balentine took any forward steps, and that was defensive only. (R. 164, 189.)
Therefore, to permit Balentine to challenge paternity would be an unnecessary
attack on the paternity of this child and would be disruptive to the parent child
relationship. For this reason, Balentine cannot meet the second prong of the Schoolcraft
test.
Based upon the foregoing Schoolcraft analysis, in conjunction with other statutory
and case law, it is clear that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment and
correctly dismissed Balentine's paternity action.
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III.

THE UNIFORM UTAH PARENTAGE ACT CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE
TRIAL COURTS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Father is the legally recognized father of Brianna in accordance with Utah Code

Ann. § 30-1-17.2(2)(a), which states, in relevant part: u[a] man is presumed to be the
father of a child if he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is
born during the marriage."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204 also addresses the presumption of paternity. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(a) provides that "[a] man is presumed to be the father of a
child if he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born
during the marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(a), therefore, reaffirms Father's
statutory right to be recognized as the parent of Brianna and to not to have to defend his
family against outside attacks by an interloper.
Balentine's assertion that this parental presumption is rebuttable is correct.
However, his interpretation of who can rebut is incorrect. Balentine argues that the Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45g-602 grants him standing to maintain a paternity action. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45g-602 provides for the individuals who have standing to maintain a
proceeding in the adjudication of parentage, and Balentine is not included. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45g-602(3) states that "[a] man whose paternity of the child is to be
adjudicated" has standing to maintain a paternity proceeding. However, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45g-602 specifically limits standing and makes standing subject to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45g-607 and § 78-45g-609. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 states that the paternity
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of a child "conceived or born during a marriage with a presumed father as described in §
78-45g-204(l)(a), (b), or (c) may be raised by the presumed father or the mother at any
time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of divorce of the
parents." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607 (2005).
Utah Code Ann.§ 78-45g-204(b) limits the rebuttal of a presumption of paternity
only in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607. As stated previously, Utah Code
Ann. 78-45g-607 allows the paternity of a child to be raised by the presumed father or
the mother prior to any divorce action or within the divorce pleadings.
Therefore, based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-204(l)(a), Father is clearly the
presumed father of Brianna and Balentine is not and the only way Father's presumption
of paternity can be rebutted is by Utah Code Ann. § 78-45g-607.
Father's presumption was not rebutted simply because Mother filed an action for
paternity and child custody on April 27, 2006. To allow the presumption to be rebutted
based on her necessary filing would only serve to punish Mother for attempting to regain
custody of Brianna and would reward Balentine for what could be considered kidnaping
of the minor child.
Mother filed her paternity action as a vehicle to retain custody of Brianna not to
establish any right in Balentine. (R. 20, 163.) When mother demanded Brianna be
returned to her when Mother and Father reconciled, Balentine refused to do so. (R. 2325; R.3.) Mother retained an attorney in order to retain custody of Brianna. Mother's
attorney filed the petition for paternity and child custody as an attempt to establish
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Mother's rights and custody of Brianna. (R. 20, 163.) Mother filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order on May 9, 2005 which resulted in a temporary restraining
order entering on the same day. (R. 26-28.) Balentine was ordered to immediately return
Brianna to her Mother and Father. (R. 27.)
Clearly, Mother filing was necessary for her to restore Mother and Father's
custody of Brianna. To adopt a policy that rewards the actions of an outsider, such as
Balentine, and allows the legal relationship between marital fathers and the children of
the marriage to be disestablished at any time, is to afford marital fathers less protection
than prospective adoptive parents, and affords children born into marriage less
permanence and stability than children born outside of marriage. Furthermore, to adopt
such a policy negates the policy considerations established by Schoolcraft and Pearson.
The UUPA was enacted to prevent such challenges, not encourage them. Before a grant
of standing to an individual to challenge paternity, the court must consider the policy
considerations of preserving the stability of the marriage and the protection of children
from disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity. Judge Quinn did so in this
case. No further information or facts were needed and the case was ripe for summary
judgment. Brianna's paternity is unassailable and the trial court's granting of summary
judgment to Father was correct.
IV.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPERLY GRANTED AS THERE WAS
NO GENUINE ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT,
Summary judgment was appropriately granted because no issues of material fact
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were in dispute. Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary
judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law." The appellate court reviews "the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment for correctness, granting no deference to the district court. In reviewing the
summary judgment, the appellate court recognizes that summary judgment is appropriate
only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Swan Creek Vill. Homeowner's Ass'n v.
Warne, 2006 UT 22, ^ 16 (Utah 2006)(citations omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate in the present case because there are no genuine
issues as to any material fact and Appellees' are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The material facts of this case are that Mother and Father were married to each other,
having been married on April 30, 1999. (R. 102, 293; ^ 1.) Mother and Father were
married when Brianna was born on December 13, 2002. (R. 102, 164, 188, 293; If 1.)
Father is listed as the father of Brianna on the birth certificate. (R. 36, 102, 164, 188.)
It is also undisputed that Balentine had no contact nor attempted to have any
contact with Brianna until she was approximately one year of age. (R. 102.) Moreover,
Balentine has not had contact with or supported Brianna since Judge Sandra Peuler issued
a Temporary Restraining Order on May 9, 2005. (R. 164, 189, 289; ^ 5.) Furthermore,
Balentine has not legally established himself as Brianna's biological father (R. 293; ^ 3)
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or presented the court with conclusive and reliable paternity tests results pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45g-504. Given these undisputed facts, Balentine did not have standing
to challenge Brianna's paternity and summary judgment was proper.
Father, by law and by fact, is the father of Brianna, and Balentine has not and
cannot rebut this presumption. Therefore summary judgment was correctly granted by
the trial court because there are no trial issues of fact to be determined.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT BALENTINE HAD NO
STANDING TO ASSERT HIS PATERNITY AND THUS PROPERLY
DISMISSED HIS CLAIM FOR CUSTODY.
Appellant argues that the trial court improperly disposed of Balentine's claim for

custody of Brianna due to the fact that it was never expressly argued to the trial court that
Balentine did not have standing to assert a custody claim. Balentine asserts his argument
based on a misguided reading of Schoolcraft.
It is true that the Utah Supreme Court in Schoolcraft concluded that "several
factors may justify granting a person standing to petition for custody of a child." Id- at
715. However, the Court narrowly defined such individuals as near relatives and stepparents. Id. In its opinion, the Court first referenced Wilson v. Family Servs. Div.,
Region Two, 554 P.2d 227,231 (Utah 1976), which held that a grandmother had an
inchoate right or interest in the custody and welfare of the children who become
parentless. The Court then referred to Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 68 (Utah 1978),
wherein it held that a stepparent had the right to have a hearing to determine whether it is
in the child's best interest to grant the stepparent visitation rights.
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In the instant case, Balentine has not established his legal standing as Brianna's
biological father. (R. 29, 293; Tj 3.) Balentine did not file a petition or complaint for
custody separate from the paternity action. The severance of paternity versus custody
was not preserved by the Appellant at the trial court level. The Utah Supreme Court has
clearly stated that, "we will review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if
exceptional circumstances or "plain error" exists." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844,
847 (Utah 1994).
Further, Balentine's argument that he could independently seek custody as an
individual who would potentially have standing to seek custody pursuant to Schoolcraft
or statutory law, is also unsupportable. Given the relationship of the parties, as described
herein, the same policy which prohibits Balentine's challenge to paternity under
Schoolcraft, and the UUPA, prohibits a claim for custody. The two claims and policy
considerations are inseparable.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court also prefaced that in determining whether
standing should be granted to an individual other than the presumed parents, the best
interest of the child must be considered. Schoolcraft, at 715. In making this finding, the
court referred to Utah statutes which allowed a court to grant grandparents "reasonable
visitation rights to grandchildren, if it is in the best interests of the grandchildren." Id at
715 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989)). The court further referred to divorce
decrees which were required to consider the welfare of the child when determining
visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other relatives. Id at 715. The court in
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Schoolcraft found that Schoolcraft had standing to seek custody of J.W.F. because he
was, in essence, the stepparent, having been married to the mother at the time of J.W.F.'s
birth. Id at 716.
Balentine has no familial relationship with Brianna in this case. Balentine cannot
argue that it is in Brianna's best interest that he be awarded standing to establish custody
or visitation for the same reason that he cannot and should not be awarded standing to
establish paternity. Therefore, the trial court corrected granted summary judgment and
dismissed Balentine's claim for custody.
VI.

APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
Appellant has raised allegedly contested facts throughout his brief with no citation

to the record. In support of his Point I, Appellant has set forth alleged facts of substance
on pages 9 and 10 of his brief without citation to the record. Appellant's entire argument
as contained in Point II, and the facts asserted therein, is made with no citation to the
record. The allegations of a factual nature set forth in Appellant's Point III and Point IV
are also made with no citation to the record.
Rule 24 (a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended in 1994,
specifically requires that "[A] party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged finding." This amendment was codified to
reflect the Appellate Court's long history of holding that they "need not, and will not,
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by the record." Uckerman v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co.. 588 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978). See also State ex rel. M.S. v.
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Salate, 806 P.2d 1216, 1218 (Utah Ct App. 1991); Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah
Ct App. 1989); State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
Throughout his recitation of the "alleged" facts of the case and argument in his
brief, Appellant consistently failed to marshal the evidence by properly citing to any facts
in the record to support the very findings the appellant resists. Beesley v. Harris (In re
Estate of Beesley), 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994). Further,the record and Appellant's
Brief is devoid of any evidence to support an argument that Father recognized Balentine
as Brianna's father, filed any pleading, signed any document, or proffered any argument
that Balentine was Brianna's father. Indeed, Father has consistently stated he is Brianna's
father and submitted such to the court. (R. 312 at p. 4: lines 3-8.)
Importantly, the record and Appellant's Brief is devoid of any evidence supporting
Balentine's argument that genetic testing determined that Balentine was the minor child's
father.
A substantial portion of the facts alleged by Appellant, throughout his brief, are
without reference to the record and the majority could not be found in the record, even if
a thorough search had been made by Appellant.
Without properly discharging his marshaling duty, the Appellant has failed to
adequately argue his brief in compliance with Utah case law, as required by Rule 24
(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, this court can "assume the
correctness of the judgment below" in its grant of summary judgment and dismissal of
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Balentine's petition for paternity. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co.. 746 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah
Ct. App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly granted Father's Motion for Summary Judgment and
dismissed Balentine's petition for paternity. In doing so, the trial court fully considered
the two prong test of Schoolcraft. Given Mother and Father's intact marriage, Balentine
did not meet the first prong of the Schoolcraft test. Further, to allow Balentine to assert
his paternity would be an unnecessary and disruptive attack on Brianna's paternity.
Therefore, Balentine did not meet the second prong of the Schoolcraft test.
Moreover, the UUPA, as codified in Utah Ann. Code § 78-45g-101 etseq.,
designates Father as the presumed father of Brianna. Utah Ann. Code § 78-45g-204(b)
allows for a rebuttal of the presumption, but only in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
78-45g-607, which allows for paternity challenges to be raised by the mother and
presumed father before divorce proceedings or in the divorce pleadings. Mother and
Father were married when Brianna was born. Father's name is on the birth certificate.
Brianna resided with Mother and Father from her birth and continued to resided with
them at the time summary judgment was granted. Therefore, the trial court properly
found that under UUPA, Balentine did not have standing to assert his paternity.
In addition, there were no undisputed facts at the time summary judgment was
granted. Therefore, the trial court correctly found no genuine issue as to any material fact
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when it granted the summary judgment motion.
Also, Balentine cannot be characterized as an "individual" who could potentially
be granted standing to seek custody as discussed in Schoolcraft. Balentine had not
established any legal declaration that he was the biological father of Brianna at the time
of the hearing before Judge Quinn; neither was Balentine established as a grandparent,
step parent or relative to Brianna. Therefore, Balentine had no standing to argue that it
was in Brianna's best interest for him to seek custody. Further, this argument was not
preserved below. Therefore, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment and
dismissal of Balentine's paternity action and claim for custody.
Lastly, the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of his appeal of
the court's granting of summary judgment.
Based upon the foregoing, Mother and Father respectfully request that Judge
Quinn's grant of summary judgment which dismissed Balentine's paternity action and
claim for custody be affirmed.
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78-45g-204. Presumption of paternity.
(1) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if:
(a) he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage;
(b) he and the mother of the child were married to each other and the child is born within 300
days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce,
or after a decree of separation;
(c) before the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in apparent
compliance with law, even if the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the
child is born during the invalid marriage or within 300 days after its termination by death,
annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce or after a decree of separation; or
(d) after the birth of the child, he and the mother of the child married each other in
apparent compliance with law, whether or not the marriage is, or could be declared, invalid, he
voluntarily asserted his paternity of the child, and there is no other presumptive father of the
child, and:
(i) the assertion is in a record filed with the Office of Vital Records;
(ii) he agreed to be and is named as the child's father on the child's birth certificate; or
(iii) he promised in a record to support the child as his own.
(2) A presumption of paternity established under this section may only be rebutted in
accordance with Section 78-45g-607.
(3) If a child has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are inadmissable
to challenge paternity except as set forth in Section 78-45g-607.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session
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78-45g-601. Proceeding authorized — Definition.
(1) An adjudicative proceeding may be maintained to determine the parentage of a child, A
judicial proceeding is governed by the rules of civil procedure. An administrative proceeding is
governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(2) For the purposes of this part, "divorce" also includes an annulment.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-602. Standing to maintain proceeding.
Subject to Part 3, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity, and Sections 78-45g-607 and 78-45g-609,
a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by:
(1) the child;
(2) the mother of the child;
(3) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated;
(4) the support-enforcement agency or other governmental agency authorized by other law;
(5) an authorized adoption agency or licensed child-placing agency;
(6) a representative authorized by law to act for an individual who would otherwise be entitled to
maintain a proceeding but who is deceased, incapacitated, or a minor; or
(7) an intended parent under Part 8, Gestational Agreement.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-603. Parties to proceeding.
The following individuals shall be joined as parties in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage:
(1) the mother of the child;
(2) a man whose paternity of the child is to be adjudicated; and
(3) the state pursuant to Section 78-45-9.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-604. Personal jurisdiction.
(1) An individual may not be adjudicated to be a parent unless the tribunal has personal
jurisdiction over the individual.
(2) A tribunal of this state having jurisdiction to adjudicate parentage may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or the guardian or conservator of the individual, if the
conditions prescribed in Section 78-45f-201 are fulfilled, or the individual has signed a
declaration of paternity.
(3) Lack of jurisdiction over one individual does not preclude the tribunal from making an
adjudication of parentage binding on another individual over whom the tribunal has personal
jurisdiction.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-605. Venue.
Venue for a judicial proceeding to adjudicate parentage is in the county of this state in which:
(1) the child resides or is found;
(2) the respondent resides or is found if the child does not reside in this state; or
(3) a proceeding for probate or administration of the presumed or alleged father's estate has been
commenced.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session
78-45g-606. No limitation — Child having no declarant or adjudicated father.
A proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having no declarant or adjudicated father
may be commenced at any time. If initiated after the child becomes an adult, only the child may
initiate the proceeding.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session
78-45g-607. Limitation — Child having presumed father.
(1) Paternity of a child conceived or born during a maixiage with a presumed father as described
in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(a), (b), or (c), may be raised by the presumed father or the mother
at any time prior to filing an action for divorce or in the pleadings at the time of the divorce of
the parents.
(a) If the issue is raised prior to the adjudication, genetic testing may be ordered by the tribunal
in accordance with Section 78-45g-608. Failure of the mother of the child to appear for testing
may result in an order allowing a motherless calculation of paternity. Failure of the mother to
make the child available may not result in a determination that the presumed father is not the
father, but shall allow for appropriate proceedings to compel the cooperation of the mother. If
the question of paternity has been raised in the pleadings in a divorce and the tribunal addresses
the issue and enters an order, the parties are estopped from raising the issue again, and the order
of the tribunal may not be challenged on the basis of material mistake of fact.
(b) If the presumed father seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, then denial of a motion
seeking an order for genetic testing or a decision to disregard genetic test results shall be based
on a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) If the mother seeks to rebut the presumption of paternity, the mother has the burden to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would be in the best interests of the child to
disestablish the parent-child relationship.
(2) For the presumption outside of marriage described in Subsection 78-45g-204(l)(d), the
presumption may be rebutted at any time if the tribunal determines that the presumed father and
the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged in sexual intercourse with each other
during the probable time of conception.
(3) The presumption may be rebutted by:
(a) genetic test results that exclude the presumed father;
(b) genetic test results that rebuttably identify another man as the father in accordance with
Section 78-45g-505;
(c) evidence that the presumed father and the mother of the child neither cohabited nor engaged
in sexual intercourse with each other during the probable time of conception; or
(d) an adjudication under this part.
(4) There is no presumption to rebut if the presumed father was properly served and there has
been a final adjudication of the issue.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-608. Authority to deny motion for genetic testing or disregard test results.
(1) In a proceeding to adjudicate the parentage of a child having a presumed father or to
challenge the paternity of a child having a declarant father, the tribunal may deny a motion
seeking an order for genetic testing of the mother, the child, and the presumed or declarant
father, or if testing has been completed, the tribunal may disregard genetic test results that
exclude the presumed or declarant father if the tribunal determines that:
(a) the conduct of the mother or the presumed or declarant father estops that party from denying
parentage; and
(b) it would be inequitable to disrupt the father-child relationship between the child and the
presumed or declarant father.
(2) In determining whether to deny a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or to disregard
genetic test results under this section, the tribunal shall consider the best interest of the child,
including the following factors:
(a) the length of time between the proceeding to adjudicate parentage and the time that the
presumed or declarant father was placed on notice that he might not be the genetic father;
(b) the length of time during which the presumed or declarant father has assumed the role of
father of the child;
(c) the facts surrounding the presumed or declarant father's discovery of his possible nonpaternity;
(d) the nature of the relationship between the child and the presumed or declarant father;
(e) the age of the child;
(f) the harm that may result to the child if presumed or declared paternity is successfully disestablished;
(g) the nature of the relationship between the child and any alleged father;
(h) the extent to which the passage of time reduces the chances of establishing the paternity of
another man and a child-support obligation in favor of the child; and
(i) other factors that may affect the equities arising from the disruption of the father-child
relationship between the child and the presumed or declarant father or the chance of other harm
to the child.
(3) If the tribunal denies a motion seeking an order for genetic testing or disregards genetic test
results that exclude the presumed or declarant father, it shall issue an order adjudicating the
presumed or declarant father to be the father of the child.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-609. Limitation -- Child having declarant father.
(1) If a child has a declarant father, a signatory to the declaration of paternity or denial of
paternity or a support-enforcement agency may commence a proceeding seeking to rescind the
declaration or denial or challenge the paternity of the child only within the time allowed under
Section 78-45g-306 or 78-45g-307.
(2) A proceeding under this section is subject to the application of the principles of estoppel
established in Section 78-45g-608.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-610. Joinder of judicial proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a judicial proceeding to adjudicate parentage
may be joined with a proceeding for adoption, termination of parental rights, child custody or
visitation, child support, divorce, annulment, legal separation or separate maintenance, probate
or administration of an estate, or other appropriate proceeding.
(2) A respondent may not join a proceeding described in Subsection (1) with a proceeding to
adjudicate parentage brought under Title 78, Chapter 45f, Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-611. Proceeding before birth.
A proceeding to determine parentage may be commenced before the birth of the child, but may
not be concluded until after the birth of the child. The following actions may be taken before the
birth of the child:
(1) service of process;
(2) discovery; and
(3) except as prohibited by Section 78-45g-502, collection of specimens for genetic testing.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-612. Child as party — Representation.
(1) A minor child is a permissible party, but is not a necessary party to a proceeding under this part.
(2) The tribunal may appoint a guardian ad litem to represent a minor or incapacitated child if
the child is a party or the tribunal finds that the interests of the child are not adequately
represented.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-613. Admissibility of results of genetic testing — Expenses.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (3), a record of a genetic-testing expert is
admissible as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted in the report unless a party objects to its
admission within 14 days after its receipt by the objecting party and cites specific grounds for
exclusion. Unless a party files a timely objection, testimony shall be in affidavit form. The
admissibility of the report is not affected by whether the testing was performed:
(a) voluntarily or pursuant to an order of the tribunal; or
(b) before or after the commencement of the proceeding.
(2) A party objecting to the results of genetic testing may call one or more genetic-testing experts
to testify in person or by telephone, video conference, deposition, or another method approved
by the tribunal. Unless otherwise ordered by the tribunal, the party offering the testimony bears
the expense for the expert testifying.
(3) If a child has a presumed or declarant father, the results of genetic testing are inadmissible to
adjudicate parentage unless performed:
(a) pursuant to Section 78-45g-503;
(b) within the time periods set forth in this chapter; and
(c) pursuant to a tribunal order or administrative process; or

(d) with the consent of both the mother and the presumed or declarant father.
(4) If a child has an adjudicated father, the results of genetic testing are inadmissible to challenge
paternity except as set forth in Sections 78-45g-607 and 78-45g-608.
(5) Copies of bills for genetic testing and for prenatal and postnatal health care for the mother
and child which are furnished to the adverse party not less than ten days before the date of a
hearing are admissible to establish:
(a) the amount of the charges billed; and
(b) that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-614. Consequences of failing to submit to genetic testing.
(1) An order for genetic testing is enforceable by contempt.
(2) If an individual whose paternity is being determined fails to submit to genetic testing ordered
by the tribunal, the tribunal for that reason may adjudicate parentage contrary to the position of
that individual.
(3) Genetic testing of the mother of a child is not a condition precedent to testing the child and a
man whose paternity is being determined. If the mother is unavailable or fails to submit to
genetic testing, the tribunal may order the testing of the child and every man who is potentially
the father of the child.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-615. Admission of paternity authorized.
(1) A respondent in a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may admit to the paternity of a child by
filing a pleading to that effect or by admitting paternity under penalty of perjury when making an
appearance or during a hearing.
(2) If the tribunal finds that the admission of paternity satisfies the requirements of this section
and finds that there is no reason to question the admission, the tribunal shall issue an order
adjudicating the child to be the child of the man admitting paternity.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g»616. Temporary order.
(1) In a proceeding under this part, the tribunal shall issue a temporary order for support of a
child if the order is appropriate and the individual ordered to pay support is:
(a) a presumed father of the child;
(b) petitioning to have his paternity adjudicated;
(c) identified as the father through genetic testing under Section 78-45g-505;
(d) an alleged father who has failed to submit to genetic testing;
(e) shown by clear and convincing evidence to be the father of the child; or
(f) the mother of the child.
(2) A temporary tribunal order may include provisions for custody and visitation as provided by
other laws of this state.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-617. Rules for adjudication of paternity.
The tribunal shall apply the following rules to adjudicate the paternity of a child:
(1) The paternity of a child having a presumed, declarant, or adjudicated father may be disproved
only by admissible results of genetic testing excluding that man as the father of the child or
identifying another man as the father of the child.
(2) Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a
man identified as the father of a child under Section 78-45g-505 must be adjudicated the father
of the child, unless an exception is granted under Section 78-45g-608.
(3) If the tribunal finds that genetic testing under Section 78-45g-505 neither identifies nor
excludes a man as the father of a child, the tribunal may not dismiss the proceeding. In that
event, the tribunal shall order further testing.
(4) Unless the results of genetic testing are admitted to rebut other results of genetic testing, a
man properly excluded as the father of a child by genetic testing must be adjudicated not to be
the father of the child.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-618. Adjudication of parentage -- Jury trial prohibited.
A jury trial is prohibited to adjudicate paternity of a child.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-619. Adjudication of parentage — Hearings — Inspection of records.
(1) On request of a party and for good cause shown, the tribunal may close a proceeding under
this part.
(2) A final order in a proceeding under this part is available for public inspection. Other papers
and records are available only with the consent of the parties or on order of the tribunal for good
cause.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-620. Adjudication of parentage -- Order on default.
The tribunal shall issue an order adjudicating the paternity of a man who:
(1) after service of process, is in default; and
(2) is found by the tribunal to be the father of a child.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-621. Adjudication of parentage — Dismissal for want of prosecution.
The tribunal may issue an order dismissing a proceeding commenced under this chapter for want
of prosecution only without prejudice. An order of dismissal for want of prosecution purportedly
with prejudice is void and has only the effect of a dismissal without prejudice.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-622. Order adjudicating parentage.
(1) The tribunal shall issue an order adjudicating whether a man alleged or claiming to be the
father is the parent of the child.
(2) An order adjudicating parentage must identify the child by name and date of birth.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4), the tribunal may assess filing fees,
reasonable attorney's fees, fees for genetic testing, other costs, necessary travel, and other
reasonable expenses incurred in a proceeding under this part. The tribunal may award attorney's
fees, which may be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in the attorney's own
name.
(4) The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the support-enforcement agency
of this state or another state, except as provided by law.
(5) On request of a party and for good cause shown, the tribunal may order that the name of the
child be changed.
(6) If the order of the tribunal is at variance with the child's birth certificate, the tribunal shall
order the Office of Vital Records to issue an amended birth registration.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-623. Binding effect of determination of parentage.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (2), a determination of parentage is binding on:
(a) all signatories to a declaration or denial of paternity as provided in Part 3, Voluntary
Declaration of Paternity; and
(b) all parties to an adjudication by a tribunal acting under circumstances that satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of Section 78-45f-201.
(2) A child is not bound by a determination of parentage under this chapter unless:
(a) the detemiination was based on an unrescinded declaration of paternity and the declaration is
consistent with the results of genetic testing;
(b) the adjudication of parentage was based on a finding consistent with the results of genetic
testing and the consistency is declared in the detemiination or is otherwise shown; or
(c) the child was a party or was represented in the proceeding determining parentage by a
guardian ad litem.
(3) In a proceeding to dissolve a marriage, the tribunal is considered to have made an
adjudication of the parentage of a child if the question of paternity is raised and the tribunal
adjudicates according to Part 6, Adjudication of Parentage, and the final order:
(a) expressly identifies a child as a "child of the marriage," "issue of the marriage," or similar
words indicating that the husband is the father of the child; or
(b) provides for support of the child by the husband unless paternity is specifically disclaimed in
the order.
(4) The tribunal is not considered to have made an adjudication of the parentage of a child if the
child was born at the time of entry of the order and other children are named as children of the
marriage, but that child is specifically not named.
(5) Once the paternity of a child has been adjudicated, an individual who was not a party to the
paternity proceeding may not challenge the paternity, unless:
(a) the party seeking to challenge can demonstrate a fraud upon the tribunal;
(b) the challenger can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the challenger did not

know about the adjudicatory proceeding or did not have a reasonable opportunity to know of the
proceeding; and
(c) there would be harm to the child to leave the order in place.
(6) A party to an adjudication of paternity may challenge the adjudication only under law of this
state relating to appeal, vacation of judgments, or other judicial review.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session

78-45g-601. Proceeding authorized — Definition.
(1) An adjudicative proceeding may be maintained to determine the parentage of a child. A
judicial proceeding is governed by the rules of civil procedure. An administrative proceeding
is governed by Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(2) For the purposes of this part, "divorce" also includes an annulment.
Enacted by Chapter 150, 2005 General Session
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LEXSEE799P.2D710
State of Utah in the Interest of J.W.F., a person under eighteen years of age. Winfield D.
Schoolcraft, Petitioner
No. 890001
Supreme Court of Utah
799 R2d 710; 145 Utah Adv, Rep, 17; 1990 Utah LEXIS 76
October 19,1990, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:
|**1] Released for Publication November 13, 1990.
As Corrected.
PRIOR HISTORY: Second District, Weber County; The
Honorable Robert L. Newey.
DISPOSITION:
The court of appeals' decision is reversed insofar as
it states that Schoolcraft has no standing to petition for
custody of J.W.F. We remand for a hearing to determine
whether it would be in the best interest of J.W.F. for
Schoolcraft to have custody.

COUNSEL:
Richard W. Jones, Ogden, for petitioner.
Martin W. Custen, Jane A. Marquardt, Ogden, for
J.W.F.
R. Paul Van Dam, Sandra Sjogren, Paul M. Tinker,
Diane Wilkins, Salt Lake City, for State of Utah.
JUDGES:
Zimmerman, Justice. Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice,
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice, I. Daniel
Stewart, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, concur.
OPINIONBY:
ZIMMERMAN
OPINION: |*712]
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
Winfield Schoolcraft seeks review of a decision of the
court of appeals which held that the juvenile court acted
correctly when it (i) determined that he has no parental
rights in a child born to his wife during their marriage

because he is not the biological father of the child and (ii)
declined to hold a hearing to determine whether it would
be in the best interests of the child, J.W.F., [**2] to place
him in Schoolcraft's custody. We reverse the court of appeals' decision insofar as it indicates that Schoolcraft has
no standing to petition for custody of J.W.F. and remand
to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether it
would be in the best interests of J.W.F. for Schoolcraft to
have custody.
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft were married on
October 6, 1984. They lived together for approximately
eight months after their marriage. The record is unclear as
to the exact date on which Linda left Winfield, but it was
seven months to one year prior to her giving birth to a son.
J.W.F., in Utah on November 5, 1985. Linda abandoned
J.W.F. on or about December 5, 1985.
A petition was filed by the State in the juvenile court
on December 13,1985, alleging neglect and abandonment
by Michael Ford, the alleged natural father, and Linda
Schoolcraft, the mother. The court appointed a lawyer,
Jane Marquardt, as guardian ad litem on December 24,
1985. On February 19, 1986, the court found J.W.F. to be
neglected and abandoned and placed him in the custody
of the State Division of Family Services, where he has
been ever since.
Winfield, who is still technically married to Linda,
was living [**3] in California and was unaware of the
pregnancy. He found out about J.W.F.'s birth in August of
1986, when he learned of the neglect and abandonment
petition that had been filed by that state in juvenile court
in 1985. J.W.F. was about nine months old at the time.
Winfield then promptly filed a petition for custody in juvenile court on August 28, 1986, alleging that he was the
presumed father because he was married to Linda and was
living with her at the time of conception.
A petition for permanent termination of the parental
rights of Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft was filed
on September 5, 1986, and on December 16, 1986, the
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guardian ad litem filed another petition, alleging that
Winfield Schoolcraft had no legal rights to J.W.F. This petition, seeking a determination that Winfield Schoolcraft
had no rights in J.W.F., was based on an allegation by
the guardian ad litem that Winfield was not the biological
father of J.W.F. or, alternatively, that he was an unfit parent or had abandoned the child. After a hearing held on
the two petitions, the court entered an order permanently
depriving Michael Ford and Linda Schoolcraft of their
parental rights. Both Winfield Schoolcraft's petition [**4]
for custody and the guardian ad litem's petition to terminate Winfield's legal rights were continued to February
10, 1987.
On February 10th, the trial court entered a memorandum decision finding that Winfield Schoolcraft was
not the biological father of J.W.F. and concluding that he
had no right to custody. In essence, because Schoolcraft
was not the child's natural father, the trial court denied
Schoolcraft standing to assert a claim that it was in the
child's best interests that he have custody. The court continued J.W.F.'s placement in the Utah State Division of
Family Services for the purpose of finding suitable adoptive parents. Nothing in the record indicates that anyone is
waiting to adopt J.W.F. at this time. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision. We granted certiorari
to review the court of appeals' decision.
The central question before us is what rights, including custodial rights, a husband has in a child born into
his marriage who is not his biological offspring. Before
addressing this question, several preliminary issues must
be dealt with.
First, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly permitted the guardian ad litem to challenge the
|**5) presumption that a child born during a marriage
is the husband's natural child, relying on our decision
|*713] in Teece v. Teece, 715 P2d 106, 107 (Utah 1986),
and Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 163, 164-66, 340 P. 2d
761, 762-63 (1959). The court of appeals reasoned that
the guardian is the representative of the child and the child
is an indispensible party to the proceeding with independent interests to assert. In re J.W.F, 763 P.2d 1217, 1221
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) Schoolcraft attacks this ruling. He
argues that in order to preserve the sanctity of the marriage relationship, only the wife and the husband should
be permitted to challenge the legitimacy of a child born
into their marriage. If Schoolcraft is correct, then the trial
court erred in permitting the guardian ad litem to challenge Schoolcraft's paternity and Schoolcraft is entitled
to a legal presumption that he is J.W.F.'s father.
We find the court of appeals' analysis on this point to
be too mechanistic and, consequently, insufficiently sensitive to the legitimate policy considerations Schoolcraft

raises. However, we find Schoolcraft's approach similarly
flawed. We agree that, as a general matter, the class of
persons [**6] permitted to challenge the presumption of
paternity should be limited, as he argues, but we reject the
notion that the legal status of the prospective challenger
is the only relevant factor, as the court of appeals held. In
determining who can challenge the presumption of legitimacy, a paramount consideration should be preserving
the stability of the marriage and protecting children from
disruptive and unnecessary attacks upon their paternity.
See Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 395, 518 P.2d 687,
689 (1974); Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d at 165, 340 P2d
at 763. This leads us to conclude that whether individuals can challenge the presumption of legitimacy should
depend not on their legal status alone, but on a case-bycase determination of whether the above-stated policies
would be undermined by permitting the challenge, nl
ni Three Utah cases dealing with standing to
challenge a child's legitimacy are consistent with
this approach. In Teece v. Teece, 715 P2d 106 (Utah
1986), Roods v. Roods, 645 P. 2d 640 (1982), and
Lopes v. Lopes, 30 Utah 2d 393, 518 P2d 687
(1974), the court allowed both the husband and the
wife to challenge the presumption of legitimacy,
but in each of these cases, no reason existed to
deny them standing because the stability of their
marriage had already been shaken.
|** 7 |
Applying these criteria to the present case, we reach
the same result as the court of appeals, albeit for different reasons. The guardian ad litem was representing the
child, one not disinterested in the issue, because his custody, rather than his mere technical legitimacy, is at issue.
Moreover, allowing the State or J.W.F. to challenge the
presumption of legitimacy is not inconsistent with the relevant policy considerations. The stability of the marriage
between Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft was shaken long
ago, and their marriage is one in name only. Similarly,
J.W.F.'s expectations as to who his father is cannot be
shaken by permitting a challenge to the presumption of
legitimacy. The child has never had a relationship with
Schoolcraft, Michael Ford, or even his mother, so he has
no expectations as to who his father is. Having considered
the legal status of the challenger and the relevant policies
that bear on the question, we conclude that the guardian
ad litem was properly granted standing to challenge the
presumption of legitimacy in this case.
A second claim Schoolcraft raises is that the court of
appeals improperly found the presumption of legitimacy
to have been rebutted [**8| in this case. In Utah, "the presumption of legitimacy will prevail unless the contrary is
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Holder, 9 Utah 2d at
166, 340R2dat 763. And, consistent with the historically
strong policies that underlie that presumption, the form of
proof admissible to rebut the presumption is limited. One
of these limits that is part of our common law is "Lord
Mansfield's rule." n2 As stated by this court, the rule is
that "spouses themselves may not give testimony which
would |*714] tend to illegitimate the child." Lopes, 30
Utah 2d at 395, 518 P.2d at 689. "The proof of such facts
where necessary [must] come from other sources." Id. at
396, 518 R2d at 689.
In Utah, the legislature has not abrogated Lord
Mansfield's rule, but has specified that certain nontraditional evidence is capable of conclusively rebutting
the presumption of legitimacy. In Teece v. Teece, 715
P2d 106. 107 (Utah 1986), the court observed that Lord
Mansfield's rule has been substantially eroded by the enactment of section 78-25-18 of the code, which expressly
mandates that courts utilize blood tests to assist in making
a determination of paternity. Section 78-25-18 provides:
"In |**9] any civil action or in bastardy proceedings in
which the parentage of a person is a relevant fact, the court
shall order the child and alleged parents to submit to blood
tests." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-18 (1987). Section 7825-21 states: "The results of the [blood] tests shall be received in evidence where the conclusion of all examiners,
as disclosed by the tests, is that the alleged father is not
the actual father of the child, and the question of paternity
shall be so resolved." Utah Code Ann. § 78-25-21 (1987
&Supp. 1990).
n2 Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591, 98 Eng.
Reprint 1257 (1777), wherein Lord Mansfield said:
"It is a rule founded in decency, morality, and policy that they [husband and wife] should not be permitted to say after marriage that the offspring is
spurious."
The trial court found that it was scientifically impossible for Schoolcraft to be J.W.F.'s father based on blood
tests and testimony by Dr. Charles DeWitt regarding the
results of the blood tests. This is consistent with sections
78-25-18 |**10] and 78-25-21. The court also relied
on the fact that J.W.F. is partly of African ancestry while
Winfield and Linda Schoolcraft are both of Anglo-Saxon
ancestry.
The court of appeals, however, affirmed the trial
court's paternity finding on alternate grounds, i.e.,
Schoolcraft's concession on appeal that he is not the biological father of J.W.F. This was error because in relying
on Schoolcraft's concession, the court relied on evidence
that contravenes Lord Mansfield's rule. n3 This does not

mean that the presumption of legitimacy was not effectively rebutted, however. We conclude that the evidence
before the trial court was sufficient to support its conclusion that the presumption of paternity was rebutted
beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore affirm that portion of the court of appeals' ruling for the reasons given
[**11| by the trial court.
n3 See Note, J.W.F. v. Schoolcraft: The
Husband's Rights to His Wife's Illegitimate Child
Under Utah Law, 1989 B.Y.U L. Rev. 955, for a reflective and instructive analysis of court of appeals'
decision.
Having found that the guardian ad litem had standing
to raise the issue and that the presumption of paternity
was successfully rebutted, we next consider the question
of whether Schoolcraft has any protectable custodial interest with respect to J.W.F., a child not biologically his,
born to his wife during their marriage. Schoolcraft argues
that he is J.W.F.'s legal father because of his relationship
with Linda. Therefore, his parental rights, including his
right to custody, cannot be terminated without a showing
of unfitness. The court of appeals rejected this argument.
It stated that once the presumption that a child born during
a marriage is the husband's child is rebutted, the husband
is not the child's legal father. In such a circumstance, the
court of appeals reasoned, the husband has no financial
obligation of support toward the child and therefore has
no rights with respect to the child, including custodial
rights. In re J. W.F., 763 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Again, we find this analytical approach to be too mechanical. It may be that no one has the same rights toward
a child as his or her parents. See Wilson v. Family Services
Div, Region Two, 554P2d227, 230 (Utah 1976). [**12]
However, the fact that a person is not a child's natural or
legal parent does not mean that he or she must stand as
a total stranger to the child where custody is concerned.
Certain people, because of their relationship to a child,
are at least entitled to standing to seek a determination as
to whether it would be in the best interests of the child for
them to have custody. See id.
[*715] We conclude that several factors may justify granting a person standing to petition for custody of
a child. As the court of appeals noted, the legally enforceable financial obligations that a person has toward
a child may suffice to give that person standing to seek
custody. However, the grant of standing cannot be determined solely by reference to legal support obligations.
Equally important is the person's status or relationship to
the child. Even if a person has no legal duty of support to a
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child, that person's legal relationship to the child may suffice for standing. Examples include close relatives, who,
although lacking a duty of support, may be perceived by
reason of that relationship to have the child's best interests at heart. Such a relationship would seem to warrant
|**13] a grant of standing. n4
n4 In addition, it is conceivable that persons
who are not related by blood or marriage, although
not presumptively entitled to standing, could show
that they had a relationship with the child that would
warrant a grant of standing. We have no such situation before us today.
Our cases recognize the right of relatives other than
parents to have standing to seek custody. In Wilson v.
Family Services Division Region Two, 554 P. 2d227 (Utah
1976), a grandmother sought to restrain family services
from placing her grandchild, who was parentless, out for
adoption until she could have a hearing on her own fitness
as custodian and/or adoptive parent. The court stated that
while only parents have vested rights to the custody of
children, "next of kin, such as this grandmother, do have
some dormant or inchoate right or interest in the custody
and welfare of the children who become parentless, so that
they may come forward and assert their claim." Wilson,
554 R2d at 231. According to Wilson, [**14] inchoate
rights entitle the relative to standing to such a hearing to
determine custodial fitness.
A similar standing result obtained in a Utah divorce
case, where this court held that a stepparent has the right to
have a hearing to determine whether it is in the child's best
interest to grant the stepparent visitation rights. Gribble
v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978). n5 In a custody case,
we stated that in "custody matters, all things else being
equal, near relatives should generally be given preference
over non-relatives." In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 298,
410 P.2d 475, 476 (1966). And in yet another case, this
court said that when determining the best interests of the
child, a court may consider stepparent status. Hutchison
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 1982).
N5 The court in Gribble actually required that
the stepparent stand in loco parentis to the child
before he would be granted a hearing. The court
was interpreting Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5 (1953),
as amended, which stated that, "visitation rights
of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall
take into consideration the welfare of the child."
The court said that in order for a stepparent to get
visitation rights, he must, therefore, "stand in the
relationship of parent, grandparent, or other relative to this child." Gribble, 583 P2d at 66. The

court indicated that if Utah had a statutory provision obligating the stepparent to support the child,
the stepparent would have the same status as a parent or at least a relative and would be entitled to
a hearing on visitation. However, because no such
statute existed at the time, the court required the
stepparent to stand in loco parentis to the child.
Utah has since enacted the Uniform Civil
Liability for Support Act, section 78-45-4.1, which
requires a stepparent to support his or her spouse's
children. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (1987).
According to the court's rationale, then, a stepparent, regardless of whether he or she stands in loco
parentis to the child, is to be treated as a relative of
the child and is entitled to a hearing to determine
whether it would be in the best interests of the child
to grant the stepparent visitation rights.
|**15|

Utah statutes also support the right of relatives other
than parents to standing to seek custody. The legislature
has allowed visitation rights for grandparents and other
relatives. Section 30-5-2 of the code states that the court
"may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation
to grandchildren, if it is in the best interest of the grandchildren." Utah Code Ann. § 30-5-2 (1989). In addition,
in divorce decrees, when "determining visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other relatives, the court shall
consider the welfare of the child." Utah Code Ann. § 303-5(4) (1989). [*7161
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Schoolcraft
has standing to seek custody of J.W.F. First, he is J.W.F.'s
stepparent. A stepparent is defined as "a person ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive custodial
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive parent."
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-2(6) (Supp. 1990). Our case
law indicates that the stepparent relationship Schoolcraft
shares with J.W.F. is sufficient to entitle him to a hearing
on custody. Hutchison, 649 P. 2d at 41; see also Gribble,
583P.2dat64.
In addition, Schoolcraft has the legal obligation of
support that [**16] the court of appeals thought indispensible to confer standing. The court of appeals was
incorrect when it said that Schoolcraft has no legal obligation to J.W.F. As a stepparent, Schoolcraft has the obligation to "support a stepchild to the same extent that a
natural. . . parent is required to support a child" so long
as the stepparent's marriage to the natural parent continues. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.1 (1987). In light of
Schoolcraft's stepparent relationship with J.W.F. and his
legal support obligation, we find dual grounds for granting him standing to seek a hearing on whether it would

Page 5
799P.2d710, *716; 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 17;
1990 Utah LEXIS 76, ** 16
be in the best interests of J.W.F. for him to have custody.
There is no reason to narrowly restrict participation
in custodial proceedings. Indeed, our case law and the
legislature's pronouncements indicate that the interests
of the child are best served when those interested in the
child are permitted to assert that interest. The question
of who should have custody of the child is too important to exclude participants on narrowly drawn technical
grounds, as did the court of appeals. Those who have legal or personal connections with the child should not be
precluded from being heard on best interests. [**17] Of
course, granting Schoolcraft a hearing on best interests
does not mean that he has any presumption of entitlement of custody. The court still must determine what custody arrangement would serve the best interests of J.W.F.
and act accordingly. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-39(13)(b)

(Supp. 1990); accord Kishpaugh v. Kishpaugh, 745 R2d
1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1987); Hutchison, 649 R2d at 40;
Gribble, 583 R2d at 66.
Schoolcraft raises two other issues: whether the presumption of paternity is irrebuttable and whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to determine the issue of
Schoolcraft's paternity. Both of these issues have been
addressed adequately by the court of appeals and will not
be discussed here. In re J.W.F, 763 R2d 1217, 1219-22
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The court of appeals' decision is reversed insofar as
it states that Schoolcraft has no standing to petition for
custody of J.W.F. We remand for a hearing to determine
whether it would be in the best interest of J.W.F. for
Schoolcraft to have custody.
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FRANCES M. PALACIOS, BAR NO. 2502
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
244 WEST THIRD NORTH, SUITE 102
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84103
TELEPHONE: (801) 534-1402
FACSIMILE: (801) 534-1422
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAYMOND L. BALENTINE
Petitioner,

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

vs.
CORINAL. GEHRING
Civil No. 054902276
Respondent.
Judge Sandra N. Peuler
Commissioner Susan Bradford

THE COURT, having reviewed the Respondent's Verified Complaint/Petition, Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order, Rule 65 A Certification of Notice, and the Affidavit(s) in Support
copies of which are to be served upon the Petitioner herewith, it appears as follows:

1.

That the Petitioner has unlawfully refused to return the minor child to her
mother, Respondent, after his temporary grant of custody was revoked and has
withheld the child from the mother.

2.

That such conduct on the part of the Petitioner constitutes a threat of
immediate and irreparable harm to the Respondent\and the minor child because
of the psychological stress and trauma to Respondent and/or the child.

3.

That Petitioner should be required to pay attorney's fees and costs to Respondent

r*

WHEREFORE, the Court having made the above observations and for good cause
appearing;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Respondent is awarded the temporary care, custody and control of the minor
child, BriannaRenee Gehring, DOB 12-13-02.

2. The Petitioner is ordered to immediately return said minor child to the custody of the
Respondent.

3. A Writ of^sgistance shall be entered dkectingjthcrSairLake City Police, Salt Lake
County Sheri^E; Constable and/or anysother apppe^riate Peace Officer tbs^nde^afiyand all

s^°

assistance necessary to aid the Respondent in regaining custody of the parties' minor child.

- 7 ^-1

4. That Petitioner shall pay Respondent for her attorney's fees and costs to prosecute this
action.

5. The parties shall appear before the Honorable Sandra N. Peuler
District Court Judge, on the 9th day May 2005, at the hour of 2:00 p.m.. at the Scott Matheson
Courthouse, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, then and there show cause, if any
exists, why the Temporary Restraining Order herein issued should not be continued during the
pendency of this action.

/£•

%$°

5. This Restraining Order is issued without notice and ex parte and expires ten (10) days
from the date of its issuance unless amended by the Court.

DATED this

J

day of May 2005 at the hour ofo2/i3 a-m^junT)
BY THE COURT

HONORABLE SANDRA
AS DISTRICT COURT
Serve Petitioner at:
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
RAYMOND L BALENTINE,
Petitioner,

MINUTES
TEMP RESTRAIN ORDER

vs.

Case No: 054902276 CS

CORINA L GEHRING,
Respondent.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

SANDRA PEULER
May 9, 2005

kathyg

PRESENT
Petitioner's Attorney: STEPHANIE E SANKEY
Attorney for the Respondent: FRANCES M PALACIOS
Audio

HEARING
Petitioner (Balentine) ordered to return child to respondent
(Gehring). Petitioner has no legal rights to custody or visitation
as paternity has not been established and the child is legally the
child of respondent and her husband.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL - 3 2006
SALT LAKE COUNTY I I j D
By.

Deputy Clerk

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Intervenor
CORPORON, WILLIAMS & BRADFORD, P.C.
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-328-1162
Facsimile: 801-363-8243

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAYMOND L. BALENTINE,
Petitioner,
v.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
INTERVENOR'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
INTERVENOR AND RESPONDENT'S
OBJECTION TO RECOMMENDATION

CORINA L. GEHRING,
Respondent,
Civil No. 054902276
GREGG GEHRING,
Intervenor.

Judge: Anthony B. Quinn
Commissioner: Michelle Blomquist

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on May 16,2006, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn,
Third District Court Judge presiding, on the Respondent and Intervener's Objection to
Recommendation to Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Petitioner not being present in
person but represented by counsel, Brett D. Cragun, and Respondent and Intervenor being present
G \KFW\Clienis\G\Gehrmg, Gregg\Plejdings\Fmdings wpdAMA
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in person and represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Court having reviewed the file
and pleadings contained therein and having considered the applicable law, the Court now make and
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Respondent, Corina Gehring and Intervenor, Gregg Gehring were married on April

30, 1999, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Intervenor and Respondent are still married.
2.

On December 13, 2002, Brianna Renee Gehring was born. Intervenor's name is on

the birth certificate as the father of the minor child.
3.

Petitioner filed a Verified Petition to Establish Paternity and Child Custody on April

25, 2005. Requesting that he be declared to be the father of the Brianna Renee Gehring and
requesting custody of the child. At no time has there been a legal declaration that Petitioner is the
biological father of the minor child.
4.

Between December 2003 and May 2005, the Petitioner spent some time with the

minor child, originally on a limited basis and increasing over time till such time as Petitioner refused
to deliver the child and a Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the Honorable Sandra N.
Peuler on May 9,2005, ordering the Petitioner to return the child to the Respondent and finding that
Petitioner had no legal rights to custody or visitation as custody had not been established and the
child was legally the child of the Respondent and her husband, Intervenor.
5.

Since the Temporary Restraining Order was issued on May 9, 2005, Petitioner has

had no contact with the minor child, nor supported the minor child. Utah Case Law establishes that
when a child is bom into an intact marriage, there is a presumption of legitimacy that the husband
G \KFW\Clienis\G\Gelinng, Gre«g\Pleadmgs\Findings wpdAMA
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is the father of the child. See, State in re: JWR. 799 P2d. 710 (Utah, 1990) hereinafter
"Schoolcraft." The seminal case of Schoolcraft does not permit a person in Petitioner's position to
be granted standing unless they can meet the two prong test set forth in Schoolcraft; to wit: (1)
preserving the stability of the marriage, and (2) protecting children from disrupting and unnecessary
attacks upon their paternity. It is undisputed that Respondent and Intervenor have an intact marriage
and family and the policy goal of preservation of the stability of a mamage outweighs any rights of
the Petitioner and the Petitioner cannot satisfy the first prong of the Schoolcraft test. Further, to
permit the Petitioner's standing would result in an unnecessary destructive attack on this child's
paternity. See, also, Pearson v. Pearson, 2006 Ut. App. 128 (Ut. App. 2006)
6.

Under the Utah Uniform Parenting Act ("U.U.P.A,") as codified in Utah Code Ann.

§78-45g-204(2), and §78-45g-607, the mother and presumed father, or husband, are the only
individuals who can challenge paternity and Petitioner has no standing to do so.
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Intervenor, Gregg Gehring, is the presumed father of Brianna Gehring and Petitioner

cannot rebut this presumption. The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Intervenor should be
granted.
2.

The Petitioner has failed to meet the two prong test set forth in the matter of

Schoolcraft and, therefore, on the basis of Schoolcraft analysis, Petitioner is not entitled to standing.
3.

Under the Utah Uniform Parenting Act, Petitioner cannot challenge paternity and has

G \KFW\Clients\G\Gchnng, Gregg\Pleadings\Findings wpdAMA
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no standing to do so.
4.

An Order of Summary Judgement and Order dismissing the Petitioner's Verified

Petition to Establish Paternity and Child Custody should issue pursuant to the foregoing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.,
Lawv
DATED THIS J ^

day of

'

2006.

Approved as to form:

BRETT D. CRAGUN
Attorney for Petitioner
DATED:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the iJ0 day of

^TfllwQ^

, 2006,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to be [M^rnailed, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [ ] transmitted via
facsimile, to:

Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

cfetary
Secretary
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
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JUL - 3 2006
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By.

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Intervenor
CORPORON, WILLIAMS & BRADFORD, P.C.
405 South Main Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-328-1162
Facsimile: 801-363-8243

Summary Judgment and Order on Objection to Recomi

054902276

JD20386118
GEHRING.CORINA L

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RAYMOND L. BALENTINE,
Petitioner,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
ON OBJECTION TO
RECOMMENDATION.

v.
CORINA L. GEHRING,

Civil No. 054902276

Respondent,

GREGG GEHRING,

Judge: Anthony B. Quinn
Commissioner: Michelle Blomquist

Intervenor.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for hearing before the
above-entitled Court on May 16, 2006, at the hour of 9:30 a.m., the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn,
Third District Court Judge presiding, on the Respondent and Intervener's Objection to
Recommendation to Denial of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Petitioner not being present in
person but represented by counsel, Brett D. Cragun, and Respondent and Intervenor both being
present in person and represented by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the Court having reviewed
G:\KFW\Clienls\G\Gehnng, Gregg\Pleadmgs\SJ and Order Obj to Recommendation wpdVAMA
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the file and pleadings contained therein and having considered the applicable law and having heard
the arguments and statements of counsel, and having previously issued the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, and based thereon and for good cause appearing therefore:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Intervenor is granted and Respondent and

Intervener's Objection to Recommendation is sustained and granted. Intervenor, Gregg Gehring,
is declared to be the father of Brianna Gehring. Petitioner is declared to have no standing to
challenge Brianna's paternity and his Verified Petition to Establish Paternity and Child Custody is
denied and dismissed.
DATED THIS

^?

day of

2006.

HONORABLE
Third District
Approved as to form:

BRETT D. CRAGUN
Attorney for Petitioner
DATED:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the \jO_ day of *\\{JLA\JPs

> 2006,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing to be Mmaited, postage prepaid, [ ] hand-delivered, [ ] transmitted via
facsimile, to:

Brett D. Cragun
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

CPV^z,
Secretary

G \KFW\Clients\G\Gehnng, Gregg\Pleadinss\SJ and Order Obj lo Recommendation wpd\AMA

Page 3

P&

